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When Colonel Vanderbilt demanded one hundred years ago, "You
don't suppose you can run a railway in accordance with the statutes, do
you," he acknowledged that some businessmen are predisposed to pur-
sue corporate affairs in ways which violate the law.' But theory and
research of corporate crime were largely dormant until 1949, when Ed-
win Sutherland's seminal White Collar Crime brought "all known
criminals within the purview of the discipline of criminology, not just
those caught by the police."' 2 In the past decade, many scholars have
stressed the inadequacy of traditional legal regulation of the activities of
complex and powerful business organizations. 3 Paralleling this develop-
ment in scholarship is media coverage of crimes committed by these or-
ganizations and the individuals who control them.
4
A growing number of observers advocating reform of the inade-
quate network of criminal penalties for corporate offenders have sug-
gested an innovative sanction-occupational disqualification. It is
intended to penalize an executive officer or manager of a business organ-
ization who has been convicted of an offense committed in furtherance
of the interests of the organization. 5 Disqualification, imposed as a con-
dition of probation for a limited period of time and under stated circum-
stances, would bar this person from post-conviction exercise of
I Quoted in E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 10 (1949).
2 Cressey, Forward to id., at iv.
3 See generally Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White Collar Criminals, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 723 (1982); White-Collar Crime Snposiam, 17 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 271 (1980);
Comment, Cnminal Sanctionsfor Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 40 (1978); Snposium:
Refections on White-Collar Sentencing, 86 YALE L.J. 589 (1977).
4 See, e.g., Courts Impose More Jail Terms in White-Collar Cnrimnal Cases, N.Y. Times, May, 5,
1980, at 1, col. 1; Taubman, US Attack on Corporate Crime Yields Handful of Cases in 2 Years,
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
5 See R. NADER, M. GREEN &JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 249-
50 (1976); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BE-
HAVIOR 193 (1975); Braithwaite & Geis, On Theog and Action For Corporate Crime Control, 28
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 292, 305-07 (1982).
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managerial functions bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the
conduct constituting the offense.
6
This comment will first explore the elements of organizational
crime and the context in which the individuals involved operate. The
need for disqualification will then be established in light of the failure of
existing sanctions against convicted businessmen to achieve the aims of
the criminal law. Next, disqualification will be shown to be an effective
addition to the sentencing arsenal of the courts. Fourth, disqualification
will be shown to be consistent with traditional sentencing concepts.
Then, through a discussion of analogous sanctions, the practical imple-
mentation of occupational disqualification will be explored, with em-
phasis on guidelines and limitations on its use. Finally, the comment
will evaluate the likelihood and propriety of judicial disqualification,
absent explicit legislative approval, of executives.
II. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CORPORATE CRIME
Corporate crime is a particular form of white collar crime. Origi-
nally defined as a "crime committed by a person of respectability and
high social status in the course of his occupation, ' ' 7 white-collar crime
has subsequently been subdivided into two broad categories-occupa-
tional crime and organizational crime.8 Occupational crime is commit-
ted by an individual in connection with his occupation and for his
personal benefit. Organizational crime, synonymous with corporate
crime,9 encompasses crimes committed by businesses, their employees,
6 Disqualification is not a new concept. Over 40 years ago, Senator Mahoney summa-
rized S.2719, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) as providing, in part:
Such officer or director [following conviction under the antitrust laws] may be en-
joined from rendering any service, direct or indirect, to such corporation, permanently or
for a period not less than 90 days in the discretion of the court, or from receiving any
compensation or from engaging in competition with the company he is enjoined from
serving.
To Amend the Antitrust Laws 1939: Heanngs on S.2719 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiiag,, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 16. The provision was not enacted.
Fifteen years later, Representative Wright Patman of Texas offered an amendment on a
House bill providing for additional penalties in antitrust cases. It called for a "court injunc-
tion against further activity in directing, managing, or advising any organization or business
engaged in, or affiliated with anyone engaged in interstate commerce as punishment for a
fourth [antitrust] offense." H.R. 3659, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 CONG. REc. H3888-89
(1955).
7 E. SUTHERLAND, sufira note 1, at 9.
8 M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME, 17-18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
CLINARD & YEAGER]. Occupational crimes such as embezzlement victimize the corporation.
Other occupational crimes-for example, receipt of a bribe to confer a benefit-do not.
9 Organizational (corporate) crime is said to involve "managerial direction, participation
or acquiescence in illegal business acts." See Conyers, Corporate and White-Collar Cime: A View
by the Chainnan of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 287, 287 n. 1 (1980).
By definition, corporate crimes take place in a setting of complex relationships and ex-
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and their agents to further the primary, legitimate purposes of the or-
ganization.10 The sanction of disqualification is contemplated here for
use against individuals committing organizational crimes by employing
the corporate form for the immediate purpose of increasing corporate, I x
rather than personal, wealth.'
2
Corporate crime damages our society in obvious ways. Crimes
which jeopardize public health, for example, include the knowing mis-
labelling of drugs and sale of contaminated food products, as well as
criminal neglect of safety precautions and refusal to report unlawful
emissions of hazardous wastes. Less obviously, economic offenses such as
price fixing, overcharges, and fraudulent measurements distort the mar-
ket and raise prices. Violations of the Internal Revenue Code shift tax
burdens and thereby subvert legislative judgments about the distribu-
tion of income. Bribery of government officials also corrupts the polit-
ical process and encourages unethical behavior as ethical businessmen
struggle to compete with their dishonest peers.'
3
Corporate crime, often diffuse in its impact and concealed in the
maze of thousands of legitimate business transactions, poses a serious
challenge to government agencies charged with detecting, controlling,
and prosecuting corporate misconduct. Because organizational crimes
are committed to further corporate goals of accumulation of power and
pectations, involving power and trust, among directors and management. One commentator
writes that in many white-collar crime cases, the defense presents character evidence to show
that the corporate defendant is well-regarded both in the community and his occupation:
"The only answer to the 'good character' defense is that the crime could not have been com-
mitted by a person of bad reputation." Ogren, The Inefctiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud
and Corruption Cases- Losing the Battle Against White Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 959,
969 n. 34 (1973). See also J. BRAITHWAITE, INEQUALITY, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 186-87
(1979).
10 Examples of organizational crime include conspiracy to fix prices, bribery of custom's
agents, use of false weights and measures, and tax fraud.
I1 Generally, corporations will not tolerate actions by their executives which victimize the
corporation. A contrary incentive is at work when the executive is acting to benefit his corpo-
ration. Hence, it is thought that corporations will punish, through dismissals and demotions,
executives who act to gain by victimizing their corporation.
12 It is, of course, true that personal gain is a factor in illegal corporate activity:
[C]orporate policy formulators generally have direct and important personal interests-
both financial and social-in an increase in the profits of the corporation. Greater divi-
dends, salaries, incentive compensation, bonuses, promotions, security and prestige-all
of which may flow from increased profits--are frequently the ultimate conscious motives
behind the decision to employ the corporate form in an illegal fashion. But the immediate
goal of these formulators-the method chosen to secure these ultimate ends-is an in-
crease of corporate profits.
Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71
YALE LJ. 280, 282 (1961).
13 White Collar Crime.- Oversight Hearings on H521-37 Before the HoseJudiciagy Subcomm. on
Crime to Examine the Characteristics, Scope and Ramifations of White Collar Crime and to Assess the
Adequac of Present Federal-State Enforcement Eforts, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-17 (1978) (statement
of Herbert Edelhertz) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings].
[Vol. 73
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wealth, they are seldom reported by those most likely to be aware of
their occurrence. On the other hand, occupational crimes such as em-
bezzlement which injure the corporation are regarded as disloyal and
therefore more likely to be reported to the authorities. 14 Most commen-
tators agree that the disparity between actual and recorded corporate
crime exceeds that for conventional crime. 15 While comprehensive data
on corporate crime have not been collected, 16 one thorough compilation
of significant corporate offenders and offenses between 1970 and 1980
revealed that of the 1,043 major corporations studied, 117 (or eleven
percent) committed at least one major offense.' 7 Some companies were
multiple offenders. The study listed 163 separate offenses,' 8 but left un-
resolved whether corporate crime is increasing. 19 Regardless, the fre-
quency and diversity of the exposed illegalities reveal the significant
economic impact of corporate wrongdoing.
20
The harms, however, are not merely monetary or environmental.
Crimes committed by prominent businessmen "establish an example
which tends to erode the moral base of the law and provide an opportu-
nity for other kinds of offenders to rationalize their misconduct. '" 2 1 On a
less abstract plane, corporate offenses undermine the market system by
14 Executives who victimize their corporations are also more likely to encounter the "ex-
ternal" control of criminal sanctions. See Orland, Re ctions on Corporate Crime.- Law in Search of
Theorv and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 501, 513"(1980) ("While the data are fragmen-
tary and largely anecdotal, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that executive criminals are
treated far less harshly when their corporation is aparty to the rime than when their corpora-
tion is the victim of the crime.").
15 The prevailing view among criminologists is that the number of all crimes actually
committed greatly exceeds the number officially reported. One commentator suggests that in
the case of corporate crime, several factors account for an even greater discrepancy between
reported and actual crime: the harm that results from many kinds of corporate crime is
diffuse or not perceived, and enforcement is frequently sporadic. Orland, suprz note 14, at
508-09.
16 According to some scholars, the FBI and Congress have until recently been lax in inves-
tigating and calculating the extent and impact of economic offenses. See, e.g., Orland supra
note 14, at 509.10; see also CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 300.
17 Ross, How Lawless are Big Companies, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 56-64. The compila-
tion did not include foreign bribes or kickbacks.
18 Of these offenses, 98 were anti-trust violations, 28 kickbacks, bribes, or illegal rebates,
21 illegal political contributions, 11 frauds, and five tax evasions. Id. at 58-6 1.
19 "More wrongdoing was exposed because of the crack-down in the aftermath of Water-
gate. But there are no data to allow comparisons over time about the extent of corporate
lawlessness." Id. at 64.
20 See Oversight Hearings, supra note 13, at 7. See also Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of
CriminalSanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 436 (1963). ("[I]t is
possible to reason convincingly that the harms done to the economic order by violations of
many of these regulatory laws are of a magnitude that dwarf in significance the lower-class
property offenses."). For a discussion of the costs of white collar crime, see PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 103-04 (1967).
21 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 188.
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attacking its fundamental postulates of fair competition and honest
financial reporting.
22
III. THE AIMS OF THE LAW
Judges and legislators must select the optimal mix of criminal, civil,
administrative, and private remedies for organizational crime. This ini-
tially requires a determination of which measures will best deter illegal-
ity, protect the public, and fulfill society's demands for justice. Whether
criminal sanctions are appropriate to achieve these aims is a matter of
great contention.
Some commentators argue that criminal punishment is inappropri-
ate for most forms of organizational misconduct because the conduct
prohibited by economic regulatory laws is often not immediately distin-
guishable from methods of business not regarded as ethically reprehensi-
ble.23 Indeed, because many federal statutes prescribe civil remedies
and criminal sanctions for the same conduct, the imposition of criminal
liability may be a matter of discretion for government officials. 24 De-
spite possibilities of concurrent enforcement by government agencies,
criminal penalties serve an important function in enforcement of regula-
tions. Criminal sanctions are necessary as a "last resort to be used selec-
22 "If corporations are to obtain the funds needed to conduct and expand their operations
the public must have confidence in them. . . ;" but "corporate violations have shaken public
confidence in business and in the credibility of accountants and of auditors. ... Id. at 188.
See also Seymour, Social and Ethical Considerations h7 Assessing White-Collar Cime, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 821-22, 825 (1973) ("The business and financial community will continue to suffer
until something is done by its leaders to set a tone which makes it clear that illegal conduct
will not be condoned, whether by street muggers or corporate executives. . . . The Ameri-
can economy depends on trust and good faith.").
23 Kadish, supra note 19, distinguishes between traditional "culpable" offenses and newer
regulatory offenses which are purely "economic" or "regulatory" in nature, and writes:
To the extent that the crucial distinguishing factor of the criminal sanction is 'the judg-
ment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition,' and
to the extent that this characteristic contributes substantially to its effectiveness in influ-
encing compliance with proscribed norms, the proliferation of convictions without
grounds for condemnation tends in the long run to impair the identity of the criminal
sanction and its ultimate effectiveness as a preventive sanction, both in the area of eco-
nomic crimes and in the areas of its traditional application.
Id. at 444. But see Orland, supra note 14, at 519 ("Overcriminalization of corporate conduct
demeans the seriousness of criminal convictions in the eyes of corporate executives, prosecu-
tors, and judges. [However,] there is a range of serious, wrongful corporate conduct which is
appropriately subject to criminal sanctions but which is substantially underprosecuted.').
24 See, e.g., Mathews & Sullivan, Criminal Liability for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws.-
The National Commission's Proposed Federal Criminal Code, S 1, and S 1400, II AM. CRIM. L. REV.
883, 887 n.14 (1973): "The formal enforcement remedies pursued by the S.E.C. are not mu-
tually exclusive. Simultaneous or successive administrative, civil and criminal enforcement
proceedings involving identical or related facts may result from a single S.E.C. investigation."
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tively and discriminatingly when other sanctions fail."'25 Generally,
regulations providing for criminal as well as civil liability are criminally
enforced only in cases involving willful or flagrant disregard for the
law,26 contrary to the fears of upper management that they will be pros-
ecuted for violations occurring without their knowledge. 27 Furthermore,
many forms of corporate misconduct cannot be dismissed as mere "regu-
latory" offenses that should be controlled by administrative remedies.
Bribery, fraud, and tax evasion are intentional crimes constituting
blameworthy behavior which would be condemned if committed by an
individual acting on his own and which are generally deplored within
the business community.
28
25 Kadish, supra note 19, at 426. See also Solomon, The Economist's Perspective of Economic
Crime, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 647 (1977).
26 The Justice Department brings criminal antitrust charges only in cases involving well-
defined types of trade restraints. Baker & Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE
LJ. 619, 623-24 (1977) ("Where complex and novel issues of law are involved, or where there
is clear evidence that the defendants did not appreciate the consequences of their actions, the
[Antitrust] Division proceeds civilly."). See also Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial
Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 409 (1978): "[M]ost criminal
antitrust cases involve hard-core price-fixing and market allocations in which the defendants
have clear notice and the Department has no responsible choice except to proceed by crimi-
nal indictment (or information in a misdemeanor case)." Thus, from 1976 through 1979, the
Justice Department brought 45 felony cases; in each, the Department charged at least price-
fixing or bid-rigging. Comment, Sherman Act Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 1971-1979, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 244, 253 n.74 (1980).
In criminal prosecution of food adulteration, only those directly responsible are charged.
When individuals were criminally prosecuted, the firms under their control had a history of
prior sanitation problems and, in every case, some form of warning and follow-up inspection
preceded prosecution. See O'Keefe & Shapiro, Personal Liability Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act-The Dotteroeich Doctrine, 30 FOOD DRUG CosMErxc L.J. 5, 28-30 (1977).
The Environmental Protection Agency and the Justice Department, when dealing with
environmental abuse, bring criminal charges against corporate officials only when the Gov-
ernment believes that "(1) They [corporate officials] had actual knowledge that the corpora-
tion was violating a standard or order; and (2) They failed to correct the violation or to
prevent it from reoccurring." Statement of James Noorman, former Ass't. Atty. Gen., Land
and Natural Resources Div., Third Toxic Substances Control Conference (Dec. 5, 1978), 10-
11, quoted in White-Collar Crime: A Survy of the Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 169, 369 n.1718
(1980) [hereinafter cited as White-Collar Crime: A Surf]. See also United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975):
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are
beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than
the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in
business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the
public that supports them . . . [The Government has the] ultimate burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt, including his power, in light of the duty
imposed by the [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act, to prevent or correct the prohib-
ited condition.
27 See Comment, Towarda Rational Theo,7 of Criminal Liabilityfor the Corporate Executive, 69 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 75, 88-89 (1978), where the author agrees that before holding a corporate
executive criminally liable, the law should require (1) that he hadpower to prevent the viola-
tion, and (2) that he had knowledge of those conditions which resulted in the violation.
28 Curnow, Economic Crimes: A High Standard ofCare, 35 FED. B.J. 21, 29 (1976) ("One may
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Even in those cases where corporate misconduct is flagrant, the gov-
ernment may for several reasons pursue only civil remedies or indict
only the corporation. First, prosecutorial manpower and expertise are
often lacking.29 Second, regulatory agencies, though possessing the au-
thority to issue administrative subpoenas for documents that may rea-
sonably come under their jurisdiction, are often unaware of material
corporate records. 30 Third, prosecutors are aware that juries often re-
fuse to convict individual businessmen of crimes, even when convicting
the defendant corporation. 3 1 Finally, prosecutors confront the difficulty
of locating criminal responsibility within a large corporation which has
a complex organization and decentralized management. 32 Thus, a deci-
sion to initiate a civil action, or a criminal action against only the corpo-
ration, may be inescapable, even when the government officials
responsible for enforcement might also favor criminal prosecution of the
corporate officers.
3 3
decry the evolution of the standards [of care] in white collar or economic crime cases, but it is
a natural outgrowth of the incredibly sloppy business practices that have become common-
place in the United States in the last decade.").
29 See N.Y. Times, July 15, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 5: "The Justice Department lacks the
manpower, the expertise and, in some cases, the motivation to conduct successful criminal
investigations and prosecutions against major corporations or their top executives . ...
30 See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 92.
31 See, e.g., United States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 310 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 969 (1963) (conviction of corporation for tax evasion is not inconsistent with
acquittal of principal officers, directors and shareholders on the same charge); Magnolia Mo-
tor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950, 953-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815
(1959). For a compilation of cases in which the corporation but not its agents were convicted,
see Note, Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71
YALE L.J. 280, 292 n.50 (1961).
32 In an era of finance capitalism, the manager responsible for operational and produc-
tion decisions is increasingly separated by organization, language, goals, and experience,
from the financial manager who today plans and directs the corporation's future. This
tends both to insulate the upper echelon executive (who may well desire that the sordid
details of 'meeting the competition' or 'coping with the regulators' not filter up to his
attention) and to intensify the pressures on those below by denying them any form in
which to explain the crises they face. This generalization helps to explain . . . the infre-
quency with which corporate misconduct can be traced to senior levels.
Coffee, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick. An Unscandahied Inquiy Into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment," 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 399-400 (1981). See also M. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPO-
RATE BEHAVIOR, 209 (1979) (Corporations often are able to shield culpable executives from
liability by trading a plea of guilty or nobo contendere as the price of avoiding naming responsi-
ble individual managers so that they are never tried.).
33 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 281. The authors explain that the procedural
safeguards in criminal cases can also be a key factor in the choice to proceed civilly. Because
a corporation cannot be imprisoned, the same penalty in fines can be more easily achieved
than in criminal actions. Clinard and Yeager also argue that civil damage suits often result in
larger monetary penalties than criminal suits. The authors list various criteria employed by
prosecutors in deciding whether to proceed civilly or criminally. Id. at 93. Of course, the
Government may sometimes pursue parallel proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel,
397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) ("It would stultify enforcement of federal law to require a governmental
agency. . . invariably to choose either to forego recommendation of a criminal prosecution
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Commentators, then, disagree on whether criminal sanctions
should be directed at the corporation or at its employees when crimes
are committed by individuals acting as agents for the enterprise. One
school argues that where the source of wrongdoing is not easily attribu-
table to an individual decisionmaker, but rather to institutional short-
comings--"fiaws in the organization's formal and informal authority
structure"-better policy dictates focusing on the enterprise. 34 Another
school, while agreeing that corporate liability is desirable, contends that
economic efficiency is maximized by confining criminal liability to the
organization itself, because as profit-seekers corporations will respond
appropriately to criminal sanctions by imposing their transgression costs
on responsible employees .
5
The efficacy of directing criminal sanctions against the corporation
alone is, however, founded on questionable assumptions about the mar-
ket's ability to regulate all corporate behavior. It also assumes the likeli-
hood and success of internal discipline within the firm. Furthermore, it
does not take into account the possibility, or perhaps the ease, of lateral
employment opportunities for dismissed executives. Accordingly, many
observers believe that the government must, whenever possible, ascer-
tain and prosecute individuals responsible for serious corporate miscon-
duct.3 6 This comment takes the position that to promote deterrence, to
protect health and safety, and to do justice, those who command, au-
thorize, or participate in corporate crime should be individually
once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a crimi-
nal tried.").
34 Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1
(1980). The author argues that much of corporate misconduct "does not typically have, at its
root, a particular agent so clearly 'to blame' that he or she merits either imprisonment or a
monetary fine extracted in a public ceremony." Id. at 31.
35 See, e.g., Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 409,
417-18 (1980). But see Kadish, supra note 19, at 434-35 (effective policy also would depend
upon the ability of the corporation to pass on its losses by means of altered pricing policies).
See also, CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 280-81 (many corporations view fines as merely
a cost of doing business).
36 See Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal
Sanctions, 17 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 419, 469-70 (1980), where Professor Coffee emphasizes the
importance of focusing on the individual decision-maker. In a subsequent article, he argues
that since the corporation and the individual defendants can be prosecuted on the basis of the
same evidence and at the same trial, the Government can save time and money by joint
indictment and trial. Coffee, supra note 30, at 387. See also Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage
Actions: Do Thqy Work?, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1319, 1534-35 (1973) for the argument that for
treble-damage actions to have effective deterrence value, they must deter the individuals re-
sponsible. Wheeler contends, however, that "potential antitrust violators have less cause to
worry about their reputations, standing in the community, or ability to find jobs because of
their violations than they would if they obtained the same personal benefit [high salaries,




IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
DIRECTED AT INDIVIDUALS
When sentencing conventional criminals, judges assertedly weigh
the particular attributes of the offender against four goals of punish-
ment-deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-and
assign the sanction best thought to implement some combination of
these ends. But, as a recent survey of judicial attitudes and behavior
indicates, when sentencing corporate criminals judges almost exclusively
justify their sentences in terms of deterrence of potential offenders. Ret-
ribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are believed to be unneces-
sary or unachievable. 38 The study reveals that many judges believe that
by the time of sentencing, sufficient punishment has already been in-
flicted on a convicted executive through apprehension, public indict-
ment, prosecution, conviction, and damage to career and community
status. This widespread belief operates in conjunction with other factors
to reduce the likelihood of imprisonment. 39 One such factor is the con-
cern judges recurrently expressed for the health and safety of middle-
class and middle-aged convicts who would be incarcerated in a drasti-
cally alien setting. Some judges also cited the executives' personal back-
37 Developments in the Law--Corporate Crme. Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Crimial
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1261 (1979) (emphasizes energetic prosecution for viola-
tions occurring under executive's supervision in order both to defer future violations and to
provide an incentive to implement business practices which diminish their likelihood). See
Note, Decirionmaking Mode/s and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091, 1129 (1976) (as
a general rule, penalties should be directed to corporate employees). See a/so Address by Ben-
jamin R. Civiletti, former Att'y. Gen. of the United States, Senior Day Ceremony, Univ. of
Mich. Law School (May 17, 1980). Concerning enforcement of pollution control laws, Mr.
Civiletti said:
We will also emphasize personal responsibility. I do not view violations of pollution laws
as simply the acts of corporations. It is self-evident that the work of corporations is car-
ried out by individuals. Congress has specifically recognized this by including in the
criminal provisions of the pollution control laws a definition of the term "person" that
includes "responsible corporate officers." Thus, we shall attempt to identify the corpo-
rate officers responsible for corporate acts so that the law may be truly enforced and its
real deterrent effect mobilized. Corporate officers will not be able to evade their respon-
sibility by delegating compliance to a level that insulates management.
Quoted in White Collar Crime: A Survf, supra note 24, at 369-70 n.1719.
For a categorical rejection of the concept of corporate illegality, see L. LEIGH, THE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAw, 185-87 (1969). Leigh advocates
increasing penalties for the individuals involved.
38 Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar Ofender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 479,
482 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mann]. The authors concluded on the basis of a field study
consisting of lengthy interviews with fifty-one federal district judges that judges were con-
cerned predominantly with general deterrence.
39 Id. at 483-84. For further explanation of these considerations, see Coffee, supra note 34,
at 456-57.
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grounds, which are typically exemplary or at least free of prior criminal
convictions.40 Other explanations for the judicial reluctance to incarcer-
ate executives stress the lack of moral opprobrium accorded corporate
offenses by some judges who believe that imprisonment is too harsh a
sanction for non-violent corporate offenses. More skeptical critics attri-
bute this phenomenon, at least in part, to class bias and sympathy for
those of like community status, a factor which several judges surveyed
acknowledged.
41
The result, of course, is that imprisonment of corporate officers and
managers is considerably less likely than for individuals convicted of
non-violent common law crimes.42 Furthermore, judges are even more
reluctant to impose prison terms when offenders have employed illegal
means to further corporate goals rather than to pursue personal gain
which often entails victimizing the corporation.43 Moreover, corporate
executives are treated more leniently than other white-collar offenders.
For example, a major study of fifty-six executives convicted of federal
crimes between 1977-1979 revealed that the average prison sentence re-
sulted in actual incarceration of only a few days.44 In contrast, other
white-collar offenders such as investment operators and securities bro-
kers received two to four years in prison in the majority of cases.
45
Observers agree that imprisonment is the most effective deterrent in
cases of deliberate, calculated crimes prompted by avarice or the pursuit
of power.46 Thus, the virtual elimination of imprisonment as a credible
threat to potential corporate offenders must be recognized and taken
40 See Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 592-93 (1977).
Judge Renfrew, who sentenced a group of price-fixers to make speeches in the community,
stressed their high community status as a factor in the sentencing process.
41 Mann, supra note 36, at 487, quotes an anonymous federal judge: "I guess there is no
getting away from the fact that the judge empathizes more with a white-collar person whose
hardships you can understand, because a life style is more like his or her own, than someone
whose life style you really can't understand."
42 A study of sentencing in the Southern District of New York revealed that white-collar
criminals stood a lesser chance of going to prison than defendants convicted of non-violent
common law crimes. White-Collar Justice: A BNVA Special Report on White-Collar Crime, ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 759, Pt. 2, at 10-11 (Apr. 13, 1976) [hereinafter cited
as BNA Special Report]. See also Posner, A Statistical Stud of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 365, 389 (1970). ("Imprisonment is a rarely used sanction [in antitrust cases]; it has
been imposed in fewer than four percent of the [Justice] Department's criminal cases, and
then mostly in cases involving either acts of violence or union misconduct."). For a more
recent study of Sherman Act sentencing, see Comment, supra note 24, at 251-52 (from 1976-
1979 judges imposed no jail sentences against 74.1% of misdemeanor offenders).
43 See Orland, supra note 14, at 513.
44 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 8, at 287.
45 Id. at 295.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647, 649 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1106 (1974) ("So called crimes of passion are different [from white-collar crimes], of
course, and raise problems of different orders.").
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into account when evaluating the present enforcement scheme. In short,
although desirable from a theoretical viewpoint, imprisonment is not
now a realistic sanction for most corporate offenders.
The general absence of an incarceration threat means that other
sanctions must be relied on to deter corporate crime. Many commenta-
tors believe that one alternative, fines, has negligible deterrent value.
Fines, at least as presently administered, are generally passed on to the
corporation which reimburses, compensates for, or fully insures against
the costs of criminal litigation.4 7 Section Five of the Model Business
Corporation Act, for example, allows for indemnification of fines if the
defendant was acting in the best interests of the corporation and without
reasonable cause to believe his actions were illegal.48 Moreover, the lim-
itation on indemnification may be undermined in practice because the
evaluation of the defendant's good faith is made by persons who may be
sympathetic to, dominated by, or dependent upon the defendant seek-
ing indemnification. 49 Thus, corporate and societal interests may con-
flict when the prospect of indemnification negates the fear of liability
which could otherwise serve as an incentive for obeying the law.
The typical punishment for those convicted of organizational of-
fenses, then, is primarily collateral in nature. It consists mainly of the
inconvenience of litigation, the shame of conviction, and perhaps a brief
probationary period. One scholar sums up the deterrent value of the
present sentencing scheme:
[I]f even criminal fines are going to be passed on by executives to someone
else, then short of a radical increase in imprisonment of executives-not
too realistic a threat as regards most types of corporate wrongdoing-the
strategies aimed at key individuals are yet to be of only limited deterrence
value.
50
Executive disqualification offers promise as an innovative new strategy.
V. THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE DISQUALIFICATION
When faced with a newly convicted corporate executive, many
judges seek a compromise sanction which, without imposing the depri-
vations associated with incarceration, still offers the promise of general
deterrence. These compromise measures have included amended
sentences, in which a judge imposes a prison term and subsequently
47 For an in-depth discussion of the "indemnification equilibrium," see Stone, supra note
32, at 45-65.
48 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 5(a) (1974). Of course, when a corporation cannot
indemnify an executive directly through corporate insurance plans, the corporation can some-
times achieve de facto indemnification covertly by means of higher salaries or fringe benefits.
49 Coffee, supra note 34, at 443.
50 C. STONE, supra note 5, at 65. The extensive sentencing survey of federal judges by
Mann, supra note 36, reveals judicial attitudes on this point.
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reduces it prior to commencement, and various creative conditions of
probation.5 ' These innovations have sometimes been criticized for their
limited deterrent value and their selective use for an elite class of
defendants.
52
One alternative sanction, for example, required as a special condi-
tion of probation that five convicted executives make oral presentations
to twelve business and civic groups about the case.53 A local attorney
invited by the judge to respond to this sanction agreed with the judge's
conclusions that nolo contendere pleas and monetary penalties are ineffec-
tive deterrents to crimes such as price-fixing. He also maintained that
the judge's alternative sentence was insufficient, suggesting that in addi-
tion to charity service or community speeches courts should compel cor-
porations to remove executive felons from their positions.
54
Many observers have lamented the seeming invulnerability of
many executives from punishment. They argue that effective deterrence
requires a credible, and serious, threat of punishment. Most business
crimes are not spontaneous and managers as a rule are sensitive to
changes in risk. Courts can presumably dissuade them, therefore, from
employing the corporate form in an illegal manner if the personal objec-
tives they seek to attain through illegality-increased prestige, wealth,
and security-are sufficiently jeopardized by. the deprivations levied
upon them after conviction.
55
Disqualification penalizes the convicted executive in several ways.
As a sanction which bars the offender from pursuing his chosen occupa-
tion, disqualification is tantamount to a fine because it imposes costs in
terms of lost work opportunities. The equivalent of a monetary penalty
consists of the difference between what the defendant would have
earned in the occupation from which he is disqualified and his earnings
in an alternative occupation.5 6 Disqualification thus offers a way to ex-
51 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
52 M. CLINARD, supra note 30, at 210, criticizes the use of innovative sanctions for only
white-collar criminals. Community service as an alternative to punishment, the author points
out, is offered to ordinary offenders in England. In another book, Clinard questions the deter-
rent value of such sentences. CLINARD & YEAGER, sufira note 8, at 293-94.
53 United States v. Blankenheim, No. CR-74-182-CBR (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1974). The
trial judge in this case, commonly referred to as the "paper label" case, was Judge Charles
Renfrew.
54 Renfrew, supra note 38, at 611.
55 See H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 356-57 (1968):
[T]he kind of conduct that runs afoul of economic regulation is neither happenstance nor
impulsive: people who commit tax fraud or conspire to rig prices, or knowingly sell
adulterated foods, have ample opportunity to calculate their courses of action, to weigh
the risks against the advantages, and to take into account the possibility that their con-
duct will expose them to being branded as criminal.
56 For an elaboration on this market-oriented approach, see Posner, supra note 33, at 412.
The recent suspension of Former Illinois Attorney General William J. Scott's license to prac-
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tract a fine from an executive who has, for whatever reasons, no present
ability to pay a substantial fine.5 7 It also presents a means of extracting
a fine in those instances where corporate indemnification would reim-
burse executives for judicially-imposed fines.
58
Disqualification may additionally serve to prevent corporations
from informally indemnifying a convicted executive through use of ad-
ded benefits and bonuses. A probation condition which disqualifies the
executive from corporate office will have the effect of making such le-
gally gratuitous payments to a disqualified executive more difficult to
implement than with an executive on simple probation who continues
to perform his pre-conviction duties; a shareholder could claim in a de-
rivative suit that the indemnification payments are unwarranted and, if
successful, enjoin payments to the disqualified employee.59 Moreover,
because the media might spotlight an unusual corporate disclosure, such
as an increased salary or benefit package to a disqualified executive, the
risk of embarrassment may serve to prevent the corporation from shift-
ing formally unindemnified fines of a disqualified employee over to the
corporation.
60
Disqualification may also help change attitudes towards crime
within the corporation. Vaguely perceived legal threats will not pro-
mote organizational re-evaluation of company policy, especially when
the criminal actions were tacitly supported, or at least not strongly con-
demned, by the organization.61 Hence, corporations which retain in
their prior managerial positions those convicted of culpable acts such as
willful tax evasion or conspiracy to defraud the United States, convey
the impression to others within the organization that such violations are
regarded as purely technical. This reinforces the organization's rational-
izations for the pursuit of profit through illegal means, typified by one
tice law provides an analogous example. Scott, who cannot now practice law, has been work-
ing as a consultant to insurance millionaire W. Clement Stone. Said Stone, "[a]s a lawyer,
Scott has an expertise it would cost me a fortune to get." See Scott's Law License Liedb, High
Court, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1981, § I at 3, col. 1.
57 Disqualification also offers a way to impose a substantial fine on an individual who has
a large earnings capacity but little present wealth. "The availability of these devices enables
one to contemplate realistically the possibility of levying very large fines in lieu of the present
prison sentence for white-collar crimes," Posner, supra note 33, at 412-13.
58 See Coffee, supra note 34, at 444.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Gross, Organization Structure and Organizational Crime, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME:
THEORY AND RESEARCH 52, 64 (G. Geis & E. Stotland eds. 1980). See also Stone, supra note
32, at 66 ("In any social grouping, it is doubtful how effective legal threats can be as an
instrument of social change, especially when the behavior to be changed has 'customary'
support within the group, involves means condoned (or at least not strongly condemned) by
the larger community, and does not result in injuries that the individual actors can clearly
and vividly connect with their own behavior.").
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instance in which corporate spokesmen cited a period of recession cou-
pled with inflation as an excuse for price-fixing conspiracies. 62 To
counter such rationalizations the law must "transform the rules of the
[intraorganizational] corporate bargaining game and thereby shape the
conduct of corporate decision-makers. ' 63 Sanctions which diminish the
authority of law-breaking actors increase the relative influence of law-
abiding ones while simultaneously punishing lawbreakers by depriving
them of wealth and other rewards derived from their exercise of
power.64 In this vein, forced exclusion from office dramatically reduces
the authority of the convicted executive in a milieu where company loy-
alty may on occasion be regarded as a higher obligation than obedience
to the law.
65
Deterrence, however, is not the only theory of punishment underly-
ing disqualification. Society may justifiably protect itself by incapaci-
tating those who have demonstrated their readiness to succumb to
illegality. Despite the opportunity or even direct invitation to do so,
most executives do not commit crimes. Those who do may reasonably
be deemed unacceptable risk-takers,66 and although no thorough studies
exploring corporate recidivism exist, returning these persons immedi-
ately to an executive position entails dangers that society need not toler-
ate.67 For example, in a case where corporate misconduct has
endangered public health and safety the possibility of similar additional
62 Interviews with numerous corporate executives suggest that price-fixing agreements are
more prevalent and overt in times of economic hardship when profits are squeezed. BUSINESS
WEEK, June 2, 1975.
63 See Note, supra note 35, at 1123.
64 See, e.g., Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitnrst Cases of 1961, in WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 117, 123 (G. Geis & R. Meier eds. 1977): "For the most part, personal explanations
for the [criminal] acts were sought in the structure of corporate pressures rather than in the
avarice or lack of law abiding character of the man involved." Geis would assign blame both
to pressures and the individuals involved.
65 See, e.g., J. CONKLIN, ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL: BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA 82-
88 (1977). As an example of a corporate environment which unduly emphasized company
loyalty, Conklin cites the promotion of the employees of an airplane brake manufacturer who
falsified test data, while two workers who notified officials of the dangerous situation were
forced to resign. For a remedy to such forced resignations, see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (an employee who is discharged
for refusing to participate in an illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices may bring a tort
action for wrongful discharge.).
66 M. CLINARD & R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 135 (1967)
("Persons appear to accept or reject opportunities for. . . [business] crime according to their
orientations toward their roles and their attitudes towards general social values. Some of
these factors are. . . the relative importance attached to a status symbol of money as com-
pared with law obedience, and the relative importance attached to personal, family or busi-
ness reputations.").
67 One executive explained that in some industries, price-fixing indictments "actually pro-
mote conspiracy . . . There's a feeling that once you've been fined, you're clean, and no-
body's going to touch you again. It's as though once you've been through a case, you're free
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violations caused by a sluggish corporate response may require the court
to remove from office the culpable individuals who are in positions of
authority over that aspect of the business.
6 8
If locating criminal responsibility within the firm is difficult, im-
prisonment is rare, and fines are indemnified, then only indirect conse-
quences-such as an executive's fear of losing his position or the
tarnishing of his good reputation-comprise the main deterrents against
executives. Yet, in many instances corporations fail to impose discipline
when illegal acts of an executive are revealed. One scholar asserts, for
example, that in the overwhelming majority of cases the corporate ca-
reers of executives convicted in the post-Watergate slush fund scandals
of the mid-1970's were unimpaired by their felony convictions.
6 9
The lenient treatment by the Fruehauf Corporation of two of its
officers convicted of crimes in 1975 is illustrative of the unwillingness of
some corporations to discipline errant employees. Following the convic-
tions of executives along with the corporation for evasion of 12.3 million
dollars in federal corporate excise taxes between 1956 and 1965,70 a spe-
cial committee of the Fruehauf board of directors met to consider the
case. 7 1 On the advice of special counsel they proposed to return the two
officers to active duty within the company, reasoning that the crime was
committed in the service of the company and that general business prac-
tice authorized corporations to insulate this type of convicted executive
from the adverse consequences of their loyal conduct.
72
to go ahead with the conspiracy." Donald Phillips, former vice-president and general sales
manager at Baird's Bread Company, quoted in BUSINESS WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 48.
68 One commentator notes the potential dangers involved in allowing those convicted of
organizational crimes simply to return to work "where the offender receives no jail sentence,
where probation controls are minimal, or where the regulatory systems fail to perform their
prophylactic functions." Ogren, supra note 9, at 979.
69 Orland, supra note 14, at 514. For an account of the post-conviction fates of various
executives, see R. Nathan, Coddled Cn'minals, HARPERS, Jan., 1980, at 32-33.
70 United States v. Fruehauf Corp., 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 16-207 (E.D. Mich.
1975), aJ'd, 577 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1979). The corporation
was fined $10,000 and the two executives were sentenced to six months and one day, followed
by a two-year period of unsupervised probation, and a $10,000 fine. 577 F.2d at 1041. Fol-
lowing their unsuccessful appeals, District Judge Thomas Thornton suspended the prison
sentences and ordered them to do community service. See Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1979, at 4, col.
3.
71 See Nathan, supra note 66; Wall St. J. Apr. 11, 1979, at 16, col. 2, and June 1, 1979, at
29, col. 1.
72 Orland, supra note 14, at 514-15. For accounts of similar phenomena see Amrep Says It
Rehired Three Former OjTers Who Did Time in 1977, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1978, at 19, col. 1;
Technical Tape Oftcer Apparenty Kept Getting Pay While Senrg Jail Sentence, Wall St. J., Dec. 27,
1978, at 4, col. 3.
Amrep, for example, re-employed three officers, each sentenced to six months imprison-
ment (later reduced) for their part in a mail fraud scheme. Finding their continued services
to be "most necessary" to the company, Amrep rehired them at $6,000-$8,000 monthly com-
pensation, "except while serving sentences."
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The evidence thus indicates that the usual pattern is to reward, or
at least not penalize, management fidelity to what are perceived as the
company's interests. 73 Fines levied against the corporation itself follow-
ing criminal conviction often do not result in discipline of the responsi-
ble executives, even when their actions did not redound to their firm's
advantage.74 One scholar offers several reasons for the absence of inter-
nal sanctions. First, the organization may fear that a dismissed em-
ployee will reveal related, or even unrelated, corporate misconduct in
order to secure plea bargaining advantages. Second, to maintain morale
the corporation may wish to protect its employees as a reward for their
loyalty. Finally, the corporation may wish to avoid over-deterrence of
those who may someday be called upon to act in the gray areas of the
law or even to violate the law where chances of apprehension are re-
garded as minimal.7
5
While the inadequacy of corporate internal sanctions indicates the
need for external limitations on who may serve in a particular executive
capacity, some critics argue that disqualification represents an unprece-
dented intrusion into the prerogatives of private sector business manage-
ment. 76 Substantially all state corporation statutes, for example, assign
to the corporation the right to decide what measures, if any, to take to
ensure against future employee misconduct. 77 The concept of the invio-
73 See Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered,
77 COLUM. L.R., 388, 389-90 n.10 (1977). Although no empirical studies exist, some observ-
ers posit that corporate executives convicted of crimes committed to further corporate goals
who are dismissed (but do not retire) are hired in similar capacities by other corporations.
See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Punishing P'ce-Fixers: Evaluation of Sentencing Alternatives, 46 ANTI-
TRUST LJ. 538, 540-41 (1978) (remarks of Victor Kramer): "I think that there may be a lot
of churning around, in which some corporations will hire the successful convicted price-fixer,
and perhaps there will be exchanges. Corporation A in one industry will take the successful
convicted price-fixer from another industry in exchange for the other way around." See also
M. CLINARD, supra note 30, at 210-11.
74 A corporation which violates the law may, even if convicted, benefit from its illegal
activity. For example, a distributor of building materials commented on an out-of-court set-
tlement for $300,000 of a price-fixing suit brought by him against suppliers: "The penalty is
nothing when balanced against that extra 10% or so profit guaranteed by price-fixing." Quoted
in BUSINESS WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 46. In other cases, the corporation may, in the end,
suffer for the misdeeds of its employees. Even so, it will often decline to discipline the respon-
sible executives. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
75 Coffee, supra note 34, at 458.
76 Senator Robert Dole, for example, when questioning a witness who favored executive
disqualification, asked, "[a]re you concerned about the federal court system encroaching on a
traditionally private sector activity, namely, a company's power to hire its own employees?"
The witness, Mark Green, responded that he did not consider disqualification to be an im-
proper intrusion into corporate affairs. See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws. Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay on S 1722-23, Pt. XIV, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 10935 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Reform Hearings, 1979].
77 See Comment, Court-AppointedDirectors Ancillay Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement
Actions, 64 GEo. L.J. 737, 766-67 (1976).
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lability of business judgment, however, is no longer persuasive. Post
New Deal society circumscribes corporate conduct in direct and indirect
ways. As one commentator explains, federal and state regulatory agen-
cies and statutes have wrought "abrupt, massive reallocation of corpo-
rate resources and priorities and, equally important, an equivalent
reshaping of management policies and attitudes.
'78
More directly, government regulations have required corporations
to create new positions, modify existing posts, and hire personnel. Fed-
eral securities law enforcement actions, for example, have imposed spe-
cific obligations on management and have constrained managerial
discretion in a manner analogous to disqualification. 79 The granting of
civil ancillary relief in the form of court-appointed management and
directors, though not entirely consistent with traditional deference
either to state regulation of corporations or to the board of directors'
right to manage the corporation, stems from the notion that inside man-
agement will pursue its ends lawfully if overseen by persons without per-
sonal or economic interests in the business.80 In more serious cases,
federal courts directly intervene to transfer decision-making authority
from certain insiders."' Furthermore, state courts possess the equitable
power, independent of any statutory authority, to remove directors.
8 2
These equitable remedies and civil consent decrees, although not di-
rectly supportive of disqualification-a criminal sanction-undermine
the argument that a business possesses the unfettered right to dictate
who controls the corporation.
Deterrence and incapacitation, however, are not the only goals of
punishment which justify disqualification. Community values and ex-
pectations are also served by the imposition of punishment against exec-
utives who violate laws designating as criminal certain modes of business
behavior.8 3 As their sharply critical reaction demonstrates, the business
78 Werner, supra note 70, at 415. Werner argues that regulatory agencies have restricted
management prerogatives and discretion to an extent unthinkable only a generation ago. For
a foreign perspective, see Fisse, Responsibility, Prevention and Corporate Crime, 5 N.Z.U. L. REv.
250, 251 (1973).
79 See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
80 Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigation and the Molding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAW. 121
(Special Issue, March, 1974). Sporkin cites Clinton Oil (SEC Litigation Release Nos. 5693,
5798, and 5891) and Int'l Control Corp. (SEC Litigation Release No. 5643) in which the SEC
settled for court-appointed directors and appointment of a special counsel whose duties were
to investigate corporate affairs and bring civil actions against those persons indebted to the
corporation because of their wrongdoing. In these cases, the SEC also "determined that cer-
tain of the principals had forfeited their right to manage a public company and required that
they terminate their management positions." Id. at 123.
81 See Comment, supra note 74, at 766-67.
82 See American Center for Educ., Inc. v. Cavnar, 80 Cal. App. 3d 476, 499, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 736, 750 (1978).
83 The importance of taking community expectations into account when dealing with
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community perceives disqualification to be effective punishment and
not an innocuous remedy.
84
Many commentators have noted the pervasive public belief that
businessmen are relatively immune from punishment.8 5 One example of
public dissatisfaction with the retention of executives in positions of
prestige and power following felony convictions surfaced at the annual
meeting of Fruehauf shareholders in 1979. In response to the reinstate-
ment of several convicted corporate officers, a shareholder said: "What
we're saying is that the American business system is rewarding criminal
behavior. I think we are engaging in a violation of the public trust.
'8 6
In sum, the loss that society conceivably suffers when a productive, but
law-breaking, citizen is temporarily removed from his position of au-
thority must be weighed against the less tangible injustice caused by
special treatment of corporate offenders.
white-collar offenders is stressed in Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critique, 86 YALE L.J.
630, 632 (1977). Liman argues that even the appearance of preferential treatment can dimin-
ish cultural support for law enforcement. See also the statement of Prof. McMahon, teacher of
business ethics at Loyola University in Chicago, in Chicago Tribune, Oct. 8, 1980, § 4, at 13,
col. 4 ("People expect executives to set a higher moral standard than the man in the street.").
84 See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ciminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on theJudcia,', 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1788 (1972) (statement of
the National Assoc. of Manufacturers) [hereinafter cited as Reform Hearings, 1972]. They re-
ferred to disqualification as a "drastic" sanction. At the same hearings, the Chairman of the
Corporate Law Committee of the Virginia Bar Association said that disqualification "goes
beyond traditional concepts of criminal sanction. . . [and] singles out the economic or busi-
ness offender for punishment not given to the convicted murderer, arsonist or rapist. These
traditional types of offenders can work on probation in any managerial capacity, provided
they can convince the organization that they have been rehabilitated." Id. at 1654 (statement
of Richard Hobson). See also id. at 1651 (statement of Charles Maddox); J. GALBRAITH, THE
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 81 (3d ed. 1978) ("In the American business code, nothing is so
iniquitous as government interference in the internal affairs of the corporation.") (emphasis in
original).
85 See, e.g., Landauer, When the Boss Gets in Trouble, Wall St. J., July 31, 1975, § 1, at 8, col.
3:
Businessmen are forever asking why their reputations keep dropping in the eyes of the
public. For part of the answer, they might look at what's been happening in the boar-
drooms and executive suites of Northrop Corp., Ashland Oil, Inc., and Phillips Petro-
leum Co.
The chief executive officers of these three large companies . . . have been found
guilty.. . of unlawful use of company funds. The misconduct generally involved the
creation and illegal disbursement of corporate slush funds for political purposes.
The law-breaking, in itself, is remarkable. Men of such stature might be assumed to
have personal standards that would rule out illegality, particularly when it consists of
efforts to subvert the American political process.
But what is perhaps more remarkable than the lawbreaking is the manner in which
the boards of directors of the three companies have responded to it. Far from fining the
men, the boards have issued expressions of support for the wrongdoers. Furthermore,
directors of Phillips and Ashland even have sought to excuse the illegality by arguing
that such practices were widespread or that the men didn't know the laws were being
enforced.
86 Nathan, supra note 66, at 35.
COMMENTS
VI. PRECEDENTS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISQUALIFICATION
Although some critics have attacked disqualification of executives
as an unprecedented departure from traditional sentencing concepts,
8 7
this characterization is unsupportable. Disqualification has been used,
both in civil and in criminal cases.
A. DISQUALIFICATION AS A CIVIL REMEDY
In civil cases, disqualification is primarily a prophylactic device.
Under state law, courts may, at the request of a shareholder, remove a
director or officer. This power is sometimes conferred by statute but
courts generally assert that a similar result can be reached under exer-
cise of their equitable power to protect shareholders. For example, in
Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp. ,88 the board of directors had reiterated its sup-
port for an officer/director who was convicted of bribing municipal offi-
cials to secure a benefit for the company. The court explained that "the
independent shareholders may well conclude that it is inappropriate for
a publicly held corporation, which must deal on an almost daily basis
with municipal officials . . . to be controlled directly or indirectly by a
person whom a jury has found guilty of bribing such officials." 89 The
court also noted that "in a civil action to disqualify a director. . . the
quantum of proof will be less than that required to obtain a criminal
conviction." 90
Disqualification was used in Cooke to protect a particular group of
interested shareholders. The securities laws similarly intrude on mana-
gerial discretion, but the class of persons protected, investors, is more
diffuse. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission often
issues decrees which either restructure management or relieve manage-
ment of various aspects of control over corporate operations when the
incumbent management has demonstrated its inability or unwillingness
to obey securities regulations.9 1
These constraints take two forms: consent orders and prohibitions.
87 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
89 Id. at 470-71. The board of directors explained to the court that the executive had
acted in furtherance of teleprompter interests and did not seek personal gain. Id. at 472.
90 Id. at 471. The judicial removal of management provides an added threat to mis-
feasant officers and directors, who are subject to removal by shareholder action. But see C.
STONE, supra note 5, at 48 ("I am not aware of any serious sustained shareholder movement to
oust a major corporation's management in the wake of any lawsuit-antitrust, environment,
or bad product.").
91 See Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques.: Expanding and Exotic Forms of Ancillag Relief,
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637, 652 (1975) ("[T]he logic behind the relief sought . . . [is] that
mere injunctions against future violations are inadequate and that existing management must
be replaced or restructured to prevent recurrences of the alleged violations.").
[Vol. 73
OCCUPATIONAL DISQUALIFICATION
Consent orders are issued pursuant to either administrative proceedings
or court actions and may be narrowly or broadly fashioned.92 Defend-
ants have consented neither to serve on the board of directors nor to
continue as an officer of a named corporation. 93 In another proceeding,
the defendant agreed to refrain from exercising "control or influence
over the affairs of [a corporation], except through participation in [court
proceedings]."'94
Exercising its power to act without the consent of the defendant,
the SEC also issues prohibitions of various types. One sanction perma-
nently prohibited a defendant "from serving or acting as an employee,
officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser, or
depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment com-
pany. . . ,,95 In another action, the SEC barred the vice-president of a
Chicago brokerage firm from serving as financial principal of any securi-
ties firm for two years, after which time he could apply to the SEC for
permission to hold such a position.
96
The SEC will intervene when a prohibition or consent decree is
violated. An Atlanta brokerage firm, for example, was recently charged
with violating federal securities law by employing a salesman who was
barred in 1972 from associating with any broker or dealer without SEC
permission. 97 Significantly, these SEC decrees restrict professional activ-
ity in a manner similar to disqualification imposed as a condition of
probation. The decrees may be of long duration and may be imposed
after an administrative hearing rather than a criminal trial with its at-
tendant panoply of rights.98
In antitrust cases courts have also used broad equitable powers to
protect the public interest. In United States v. E. I du Pont de Nemours &
Co. ,99 the Supreme Court, while discouraging the use of civil proceed-
ings to punish defendants, nevertheless remarked that "courts are au-
92 See Jacobs,Judicial andAdministrative Remedies Available to the SECfor Breaches ofRule lOb-
5, 53 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 397, 446 (1979).
93 SEC v. Hurwitz, Litigation Release No. 7451 (June 16, 1976), 9 SEC Docket 923.
94 SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7508 (Aug. 2, 1976), 10
SEC Docket 194.
95 Financial Management Corp., Investment Adviser's Act Release No. 545 (Oct. 19,
1976), 10 SEC Docket 730, 731.
96 Wall St. J., June 28, 1978, at 42, col. 3. A "financial principal" is a position similar to a
treasurer.
97 See SEC Charges President of Broker in Atlanta Over Securities Sales, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1981,
at 14, col. 3.
98 See Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission An Introduction to the Enforcement of the
Federal Sezeties Laws, 17 AM. CRIM L. REv 121, 124 n.18 (1979). The author notes that
"[t]he SEC's jurisdiction is limited, however, and, in principle, there is no reason why reme-
dies available to a civil court should be denied to a criminal court where the defendant has
been found guilty under an even higher burden of proof."
99 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
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thorized, indeed required, to decree relief effective to redress the
violations, whatever the adverse effect of such a decree on private inter-
ests."' 00 In Unied Stales v. Grinnel Corp. ,101 decided several years after du
Pont, the Supreme Court recognized that an effective decree in an anti-
trust case might include a court order barring civil antitrust defendants
from employing the president of one of the -defendants. The Grinnell
Court held that "relief of that kind may be appropriate where the pred-
atory conduct is conspicuous."'' 0 2 In Grinnell, however, the Supreme
Court found such relief unwarranted by the facts and reversed the dis-
trict court, which had ordered the disqualification "to make certain that
the general public is not further prejudiced by the continued manage-
ment of defendant's by one who has demonstrated defiance of legal
prohibitions,"' 1 3 on the ground that egregious conduct was not suffi-
ciently made out on the record.'0 4 Thus, the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that disqualification can be used in the civil antitrust area
to protect the general public, rather than simply to protect shareholders
or the investing public. Like disqualification in the criminal context, it
would be implemented only after a showing of clearly culpable
misconduct.
The use of disqualification in civil cases does not directly support
disqualification as a condition of probation after criminal conviction.
Nevertheless, courts routinely impose remedies which, in effect, penalize
violations of civil statutes to deter third parties from similar conduct,
even though equity has traditionally forbidden forfeitures or imposition
of decrees with penal purposes. Some observers have questioned the
propriety of using civil enforcement provisions of laws such as the securi-
ties acts to punish or deter.10 5 When used as part of a criminal sentence,
however, disqualification represents not a departure from, but rather an
innovation in, the traditional aims of the criminal law to deter, incapac-
itate, and punish offenders. Importantly, disqualification follows crimi-
nal proceedings, which have a higher standard of proof than civil
actions, and also provide safeguards such as indictment and trial by
jury.
B. STATUTORY POST-CONVICTION DISQUALIFICATION
Various federal statutes permit disqualification from positions
100 Id. at 326.
101 364 U.S. 563 (1966).
102 Id. at 579.
103 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 260 (D.R.I. 1964).
104 384 U.S. at 579.




which are not public but infused with the public interest. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 prohibits persons convicted of any crimi-
nal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust from serving as a di-
rector, officer, or employee of a federally insured bank.106 The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows suspension or revocation of the
registration of any broker or dealer convicted of a felony or misde-
meanor which arises out of the conduct of his business as broker, dealer,
or investment adviser.1
0 7
State and municipal ordinances also impose disabilities, some speci-
fying that former criminals are permanently barred, 08 others permit-
ting employment at a specified time after conviction.109 Other statutes
establish character standards that must be met to qualify for admission
to an occupation, and felony convictions often constitute grounds for
denial or revocation of licenses."l 0 When a license is refused or revoked
on this basis, courts traditionally hesitate to disturb the determination of
the licensing authority."' While these forms of disqualification can be
very harsh, resulting in a permanent bar from an occupation, executive
disqualification would be of limited duration. Like disqualification as a
condition of probation, these statutory disabilities are infringements on
private sector employment.
Under current law, many convicted persons are barred from hold-
ing public office as well as public employment. 112 Along these lines, one
106 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (1980).
107 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)(B) (1981). See also Mathews & Sullivan, supra note 22, at 928-
29, n.213: "Under present law, a felony conviction triggers certain mandatory or discretion-
ary statutory disqualifications from a person's association with a broker-dealer, investment
advisor, or investment company. Such disqualifications may run for as long as ten years."
The authors list the various disqualifying provisions of the 1934 Act, The Advisor's Act, and
the 1940 Act.
108 For a thorough explanation of various forms of disabilities imposed on the employment
of ex-convicts, see Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND.
L. REv. 929, 1009-12 (1970). See also Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403
(1967).
109 Comment, supra note 104, at 1009-12.
110 Id. Corporate management is among the few professional occupations of high status
which remains unlicensed.
111 See, e.g., Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 299, 165 N.E.2d 163, 197
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1959) (denial of a public cart license upheld because of a felony conviction 20
years earlier). The court stressed that the petitioner's conviction had been for criminal activi-
ties linked to the business in which he sought to be licensed. Id. at 313, 165 N.E.2d at 170,
197 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
112 For a collection of relevant federal statutes, see 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAw 1339-42 (1970). Examples in-
clude 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1969) (concealment, removal or mutilation of public documents by
official having custody thereof; 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1969) (treason); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1969)
(bribery of public officials), imposes a $20,000 fine (or three times the gain, whichever is
greater) and up to fifteen years' imprisonment, but provides only that the offender may be
disqualified from holding office.
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federal court held:
The state has a legitimate interest in excluding from office those who
would impair efficiency and honesty in government operations. . . . To
achieve this end, conditions and penalties can be imposed even where they
may involve the relinquishment of constitutional rights and privileges, so
long as they bear a reasonable relation to the end sought to be achieved. "13
When so used, disqualification is not intended to be punitive, but pro-
phylactic. Its practical effect, of course, is the same as that of disqualifi-
cation as a condition of probation.
It might be argued that government employment or elected office is
a privilege and not a right, and therefore offers an unsuitable analogy
for intrusions into the private sector. Such criticism, however, rests on
an obsolete view of the corporation as an entity without capacity to do
both extensive good and extensive harm. One scholar posits that
"[u]ndoubtedly, the major corporation today functions in fact, if not in
law, as a quasi-governmental body. Corporations deliver goods and
services which in other societies are provided by the state. This fact,
combined with the aggregation of capital, reinforces the perception that
greater accountability is required of the corporation." 114 In sum, execu-
tives managing corporations which greatly affect society are no less im-
portant than elected local or state officials, and should therefore be
subject to similar restrictions following conviction for serious crimes.
C. DISQUALIFICATION AND LABOR LAW
Labor law also provides examples of disqualification, many of
which are grounded in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act of 1959.115 Section 504(a) of the LMRDA forbids convicted
felons from holding union office or serving as a labor relations consult-
ant during the five years following conviction for enumerated felonies
involving "moral turpitude." 16
113 United States v. Warden of Walkill Prison, 246 F. Supp. 72, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afd,
355 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing that public con-
tractors may be disqualified from receiving contracts for refusing'to waive immunity before
investigative bodies).
114 Moore, Corporate Oftcer and Director Liability: Is Corporate Behavior Bgond the Control of Our
Legal ystem?, 10 CAP. L. REV. 69, 78 (1980).
115 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
116 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) provides:
No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party or who has been con-
victed of, or served any part of a prison term resulting from his conviction of, robbery,
bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics
laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill, assault which inflicts grievous bodily in-
jury, or a violation of subchapter III or IV of this chapter, or conspiracy to commit any
such crimes, shall serve-
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar gov-
erning body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an
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In DeVeau v. Braisted,117 the Supreme Court upheld a state provi-
sion, similar to § 504(a), which permanently barred convicted felons
from holding union office. The Court rejected the plaintiffs due process
argument and found that LMRDA § 504(a) did not pre-empt the state
act. 18 Citing the "wide utilization of disqualification of convicted
felons for certain employments closely touching the public interest,"1 19
the Court upheld the bar as a "familiar legislative device to insure
against corruption in specified vital areas."'
20
Commentators cite § 504(a) as an example of unequal treatment of
union and corporate officers. 121 At a congressional hearing prior to pas-
sage of the provision, a disappointed labor representative protested,
"[w]hat about unions having the same right as employers to select their
own officers and employees?"' 22 Section 504(a) has a sweeping effect
because it does not restrict the disqualifying felonies to those committed
during the course of union duties or those directly bearing on ability to
perform union duties in a trustworthy or legal manner. Referring to the
Deeau case in United States v. Brown, 123 Justice White noted that "[t]he
legislature was permitted to disqualify all members of the class, rather
than being required to delegate to the courts the responsibility of deter-
mining the character of each individual based on all relevant facts, in-
cluding prior conviction."' 2
4
Although union and corporate managements are selected by differ-
ent means and attend to different concerns, sufficient similarities exist
between the two types of organization to justify the extension of disqual-
employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organiza-
tion, or
(2) as a labor relations consultant to a person engaged in an industry or activity
affecting commerce, or as an officer, director, agent, or employee (other tharr as an
employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any group or associa-
tion of employers dealing with any labor organization,
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party,
or for five years after such conviction or after the end of such imprisonment ...
117 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
118 Section 8 of New York's Waterfront Commission Act of 1953, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§ 8 (McKinney 1953).
119 363 U.S. at 159.
120 Id. at 158-59.
121 Christopher Stone, for example, notes that while union officers are disqualified from
being union officers for five years after conviction, the law is unresponsive in this regard to the
criminal record of corporate officers. "The union crook caught under Landrum-Griffin can
turn around and swing a job with management." C. STONE, supra note 5, at 193.
122 Labor-Management Reform Legislatio: Hearings on HR. 3540, H)Z 3302, HR. 1173, and
HR. 4474 Before A joint Subcomm on Labor-Management Refornn Legislation of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981 (1959) (statement of Sidney Zagri).
123 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (White, J., dissenting). Brown struck down the section of
L.M.R.D.A. which prohibited former or present Communists from holding union office as an
unconstitutional bill of attainder.
124 Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
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ification to corporate executives. The Court in .DeVeau v. Brai'sed rea-
soned that disqualification was appropriate for union officials because
unions affect the public interest.1 25 Corporate conduct must also be
viewed as a public concern. Modern corporations exercise vast control
over exchanges of human and natural resources and influence the econ-
omy, the environment, and even international affairs.' 26 The Court in
DeVeau also noted congressional concern with union corruption. One
need not endorse the view that a "corporate crime wave" is underway to
find in present corporate misconduct grave threats to enforcement of the
law. 127 One commentator writes that "[t]he lack of perceived internal
checks on errant behavior by business corporations makes the corporate
entity a ready target for the imposition of external constraints. Increas-
ingly, the external constraint of first choice is the criminal law." 2 Sig-
nificantly, the form of occupational disqualification suggested for
corporate officers and managers would be used only in cases where the
offense was committed by one acting in the course of business. This
limited application contrasts with that of § 504(a), in which individuals
may be disqualified from union office for committing felonies unrelated
to their union duties. Furthermore, the decision to disqualify corporate
wrongdoers would not be mandatory, as it is under § 504(a), but would
be made on a case-by-case basis by a sentencing judge considering all
relevant factors.
D. DISQUALIFICATION AS A SPECIAL CONDITION OF PROBATION
Section 504(a), of course, explicitly conferred on courts the power
to disqualify convicted union officials. Presently, however, no such spe-
cific authority exists to disqualify executives. Nevertheless, courts in-
voke disqualification independently of any specific statutory authority.
By imposing disqualification as a special condition of probation courts
have broadened the use of disqualification from the civil into the crimi-
nal law.
Labor law has provided fertile ground for disqualification of union
officials by state and federal courts acting only on the basis of general
probation statutes. In one California case predating the LMRDA, three
defendants were placed on ten-year probation, during which time they
125 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
126 See general'y A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE 223 (1976): "In terms of
totality of assets, the largest corporations overshadow all save about a dozen of the nation-
states of the planet. . . . Ever increasingly, significant decisions affecting people everywhere
are made by corporate managers, not political officers."
127 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.




could not hold union office, receive salary for any union services, or par-
ticipate in union registrations. 129 In addition, the defendants were re-
quired to file an annual affidavit that all payments of fines were made
from their own funds and that they continued to hold no union office.
The California Supreme Court dismissed their claim that these condi-
tions of probation exceeded the trial judge's probation power. "[S]ince
it could be and presumably was found that these defendants are guilty
of crimes growing out of union activities, it appears not improper that
restrictions be placed upon such activities as a condition of proba-
tion."' 30 The court added that a defendant who believes a grant of pro-
bation imposes unsatisfactory conditions may refuse it and instead serve
the sentence which was suspended.
131
In a similar case in federal court, a defendant was forbidden from
holding union office but was not barred from membership in any labor
organization. 132 The Eighth Circuit deemed it anomalous that a person
"should complain of such an order of probation when it was within the
lawful authority of the trial court to have given a sentence of ten years
imprisonment and $10,000 [fine]."' 33 The court declared the restriction
to be lawful, citing the broad power of the trial court to "suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on proba-
tion for such period (not exceeding five years) and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems best."'1 34 In a more recent federal case,
the defendant labor union official was convicted of illegally demanding
money from an employer. 135 The court upheld suspension of the de-
fendant's prison sentence and imposition of a five-year period of proba-
tion with the special condition that during the five years the defendant
would neither seek nor accept employment with any labor union.136
Outside of the labor field, courts have used special conditions of
probation to restrict employment or limit professional activity. Thus, a
doctor was ordered not to practice medicine during the five years he was
on probation. 137 This sanction was imposed independently of any par-
allel license-revocation which may have occurred in a civil proceeding.
In another case, a securities dealer convicted of devising a scheme to
129 People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 323 P.2d 397, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958).
130 Id. at 199, 323 P.2d at 413.
131 Id. It is not settled, however, that a convicted person always has the right to refuse
probation and undergo imprisonment. See Cooper v. U.S., 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937)
(Federal Probation Act "vests a discretion in the Court, not a choice in the convict.").
132 Berra v. United States, 221 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1955), aj'd, 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
133 Id. at 598.
134 Id.
135 United States v. Barrasso, 372 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1967).
136 Id. at 137.
137 People v. Frank, 94 Cal. App. 2d 740, 211 P.2d 350 (1949).
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defraud through the mails was prohibited from participating in any ca-
pacity in any stock or bond sale. 138 Again, this sanction was imposed
independently of any pending SEC civil proceeding similarly to limit his
professional activity as a broker/dealer. In other cases, a lawfully-em-
ployed handicapper of race horses was ordered to cease frequenting race
tracks;139 a railroad dining car employee convicted of conspiracy to steal
from passengers was denied the right to return to a job on trains;140 and
a lawyer convicted of forging a deed was restrained for one year from
practicing law.
14 1
In all of these cases restraining defendants from engaging in a par-
ticular occupation or profession, trial courts imposed conditions of pro-
bation not specifically mentioned in the probation statutes. The Federal
Probation Act, 142 like most state provisions, provides that upon entering
judgment of conviction, the court has broad discretion to impose terms
and conditions of probation for up to five years. Although disqualifica-
tion is not included among the several conditions listed in the Federal
Probation Act, 143 the specified conditions have been uniformly held not
to be exclusive. 44 Accordingly, courts have exercised their sentencing
discretion to fashion alternatives, including disqualification, to the sim-
ple command that the probationer obey the law upon release.
E. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
Occupational disqualification has been challenged on various
grounds. In United States v. Villarin Gerena, 14 5 the First Circuit found no
abuse of trial court discretion in conditioning the probation of a police-
man, convicted of criminal misuse of his position, upon his resignation
from the police force for the duration of his two-year probationary pe-
riod. The court dismissed without discussion the defendant's claim that
the condition constituted cruel and unusual punishment.' 46 While rec-
ognizing that resignation might result in hardship to the defendant's
138 United States v. Bishop, 537 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1976).
139 Stone v. United States, 153 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1946).
140 United States v. Greenhaus, 85 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1936).
141 Yarborough v. State, 119 Ga. App. 46, 166 S.E.2d 35 (1969). This penalty was imposed
independently of apy possible state disbarrment proceedings.
142 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
143 Among the conditions listed in the Federal Probation Act are restitution and submis-
sion to community treatment. Id.
144 See, e.g., Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911
(1963). Here, the court found reasonable a special probation condition prohibiting the de-
fendant, who had been found guilty of impersonating an FBI agent in a ruse in connection
with his occupation as an automobile repossessor, from engaging in the repossession business.
324 F.2d at 359.
145 553 F.2d 723 (1st Cir. 1977).
146 Id. at 727.
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family, the court found these consequences to be the inevitable result of
all sentencing and therefore upheld the disqualification from service for
the two-year period.147
A union corruption case helps to define the limits of judicial discre-
tion in probation decisions. Applying the same standards used in cases
challenging probation conditions, the federal court in Ho# v. Saxbe' 48
upheld a parole condition which restrained Jimmy Hoffa from partici-
pating in union activities for approximately eight years. The court rea-
soned that Hoffa had committed crimes directly related to his
participation in union activities. 49 In light of Hoffa's corrupt activity,
the government was free to use disqualification to safeguard the "integ-
rity of unions inasmuch as unions exert great influence on the economic
life of the nation and on the welfare of individual members of un-
ions."' 50 The court dismissed Hoffa's claim that the limitations on his
right of association and right to pursue his chosen occupation were un-
constitutional, holding that the governniental interest in preservation of
the integrity of labor unions was "substantial."' 5 1 The court also held
that this substantial government interest imposed only an incidental re-
straint on Hoffa's right of association and free speech:
We also find that the condition by its very term is directed towards Mr.
Hoffa's "management" of union activities and not intended to restrain
speech as such. It is true, however, that the condition at least partially
restrains... [his] right of association. In this connection, both the right of
association and plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right to pursue his chosen oc-
cupation merge. Such restrictions which in a sense "disqualify" an indi-
vidual from pursuing specified professions have been widely used and
sustained in the face of constitutional challenge.
152
Conditions of probation often serve to restrain association with cer-
tain individuals or situations thought undesirable for the probationer.
In Malone v. United States,' 53 the Ninth Circuit upheld a condition of
probation which provided that a defendant, convicted of unlawful ex-
portation of firearms, refrain from participating in any American Irish
147 Id.
148 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974).
149 Id. at 1238. James R. Hoffa, former Teamsters President, was sentenced to thirteen
years in prison for obstruction ofjustice and conspiracy to defraud a Teamsters Pension fund.
President Nixon commuted Hoffa's sentence to six and one-half years, conditioning his parole
on his agreement not to engage in direct or indirect management of any labor organization
prior to March 6, 1980. Upon his release Hoffa was offered a job as assistant to the president
and business representative of the Teamsters. The lawsuit sought an order nullifying the
condition and enjoining President Nixon from returning Hoffa to prison for seeking union
office. Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1974, at 20, col. 1.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1240.
152 Id.
153 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975).
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Republican Movement activities or accepting any employment that di-
rectly or indirectly involved him with any Irish organization. 154 Noting
that these restrictions were reasonably related to the goals of probation
and the accomplishment of public order and safety, the court said: "If
the trial judge could only prohibit active association within a group hav-
ing an illegal purpose, then the Court would be, in effect, restricted to
the standard condition that the probationer obey the law."' 55
Endorsing a more restrictive approach to occupational disqualifica-
tion, the court in United States v. Pastore156 struck down a probation con-
dition which ordered the appellant's resignation from the bar following
his conviction for filing a false income tax return. Because the crime was
not committed against a client, the court held that the treatment of the
defendant and the protection of the public were only tenuously con-
nected in this instance. 157 The court was also disturbed by the indefinite
duration of the disbarment and said that longstanding state disbarment
procedures were a more appropriate forum for such proceedings. 58
The Pastore court did, however, accept the broad standard which
requires that probation conditions bear a reasonable relationship to the
treatment of the accused and the protection of the public. While calling
for "careful scrutiny of an unusual and severe probation condition," the
court recognized that broad judicial discretion in the design of proba-
tion conditions allows for case-by-case development of the contours of
the sanction.'5 9 This accords with the Supreme Court's holding in Burns
v. United States160 which made broad discretion the first principle of pro-
bation: "To accomplish the purpose of the [probation] statute, an ex-
ceptional degree of flexibility in administration is essential. It is
necessary to individualize each case . . . .[C]omprehensive considera-
tion to the particular situation of each offender. . . [is] possible only in
154 502 F.2d at 556.
155 Id. The Federal Probation Act has withstood attacks on its constitutionality. See
United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970) (Probation Act is not unconstitutional
delegation of power to the courts); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1958).
156 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976).
157 Id. at 683.
158 Id. at 682. But see Ogren, supra note 9, at 977:
Business and professional laws and regulations, which should mesh with the criminal law
to limit repeat offenses, very frequently do not adequately accommodate criminal con-
victions. In some jurisdictions, for example, lawyers are not automatically disbarred fol-
lowing felony convictions. The lawyer is often entitled to a separate disbarrment
proceeding with a separate specification of charges, and may continue in practice pend-
ing the outcome. Frequently, economic regulations are a patchwork, covering some pro-
fessions but leaving others unregulated.
159 537 F.2d at 681.
160 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
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the exercise of a broad discretion."' 6 1
When reviewing challenges to occupational disqualifications, ap-
pellate courts focus on several factors to determine the validity of the
probation condition imposed: 162 (1) Is the prohibited occupational ac-
tivity one in which the defendant was engaged when he committed the
offense? (2) Is the condition a reasonable, if not the best, way to prevent
similar offenses from reoccurring and therefore a reasonable way to pro-
tect the public? (3) Does the condition have a reasonable relationship to
the treatment of the accused by preventing his exposure to the tempta-
tion to resume illegality?
The release of convicted executives under court-imposed disqualifi-
cation serves these traditional ends of probation. As a rehabilitative and
incapacitating device, disqualification reasonably limits access to those
positions of authority which were abused by the defendant, without
eliminating, as imprisonment does, his ability to make a living else-
where. Because organizational pressures or rationalizations in the name
of corporate loyalty may persist following a conviction of a corporation
and its executives, summary reinstatement of those who have demon-
strated willingness to engage in illegal conduct subjects society to unnec-
essary risks of future misconduct. 163
Deterrence and retribution are also served by the imposition of spe-
cial conditions of probation. 64  The Ninth Circuit recently said,
"[c]onditions which serve -to protect the public from recidivism by the
petitioner or to deter others by way of example are not contrary to the
purposes of the [Probation] Act so long as all the conditions construed
together serve substantially the purpose of rehabilitation."' 165 Courts
have also acknowledged the punitive aspect of probation. The court in
In re Buehrer166 stated: "Probation assumes the offender can be rehabili-
tated without serving the suspended jail sentence. But this is not to say
that probation is meant to be painless. Probation has an inherent sting,
161 Id. at 220. Trial courts have exercised this discretion to formulate broad terms and
conditions of probation. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 549 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1976) (af-
firming total abstinence from alcohol as a condition); United States v. Frurukawa, 596 F.2d
921 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming condition of probation that defendant associate only with law-
abiding persons and the subsequent order by the probation officer that the probationer re-
frain from associating with an individual who appeared to the probation officer to be in-
volved in crime).
162 See, e.g., Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1963).
163 See general'y C. STONE, srupra note 5.
164 The need for deterrence of white-collar crime is highlighted by an account of antitrust
violations in Bus. WK. June 2, 1975, at 42: "With remarkable frankness, some price-fixers
admit they consciously flout the law, balancing the risk of discovery against a dependable
gain in sales or profits."
165 United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Oir. 1975).
166 In re Buehrer, 50 N.J. 501, 236 A.2d 592 (1967).
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and restrictions placed upon the freedom of the probationer are realisti-
cally punitive in quality."
6 7
Courts do, on occasion, set aside extreme conditions of proba-
tion. 168 One commentator argues that probationers retain certain per-
sonal rights and that an individual's right to work might be violated in
cases where an individual loses his right to secure any employment.
169
Disqualification of an executive is suggested as a condition of probation
applying only to managerial functions bearing a direct relationship to
the conduct constituting the offense. Accordingly, it would not elimi-
nate the defendant's ability to work, but only curtail the scope of his
employment responsibilities.
VII. STANDARDS FOR AND ADMINISTRATION OF DISQUALIFICATION
When recommending sentences, federal prosecutors have been
urged to consider the value in certain cases of innovative probation con-
ditions, including disqualification. A recent Justice Department publi-
cation states:
[I]n a case in which a sentencing recommendation would be appropriate
and in which it can be anticipated that a term of probation will be im-
posed, the responsible government attorney may conclude that it would be
appropriate to recommend, as a specific condition of probation, that the
defendant desist from engaging in a particular type of business.'
70
In evaluating such a recommendation, a court must identify the pur-
poses which the suggested sanction aims to achieve and, if imposed,
limit the scope and duration of the condition in accordance with these
aims.
Accordingly, a court imposing disqualification should issue the of-
fender a certificate stating which privileges are lost, the duration of the
deprivation, and the reasons for the court's determination.' 7' These cer-
167 Id. at 509, 236 A.2d at 596. Traditionally, probation was conceived of as a substitute
for punishment. This view is no longer generally held. See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 899 (1977) ("In keeping with modern criminal justice philosophy, probation is stated as
a Form of Sentence, rather than, as in current law, a suspension of the imposition or execu-
tion of sentence.").
168 For cases setting aside extremely intrusive conditions of probation as unconstitutional,
see Comment,Judia'a Review ofProbation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 197-207 (1967).
169 See Best & Birzon, Conditions offPobation" An Analysis, 51 GEO. LJ. 809, 834-36 (1936).
The right to secure gainful employment has, at times, been endorsed by the Supreme Court
although not in the probation context. See, e.g., Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)
("The right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of
the Fifth Amendment."). But see Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
170 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, Pt. G(3b), (pamphlet,
July, 1980). See general.5 Comment,Justice Department's Posecution Guideline ofLittle Value to State
and Local Prosecutors, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 955 (1981).
171 See Special Project, supra note 104, at 1237. The authors suggest such a certificate in
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tificates could be modeled after SEC orders. 172 Examples of conditions
which might be appropriately included in the certificate are: prohibit-
ing a defendant from holding a position as an officer or director of a
specific corporation; 173 forcing the offender's resignation as chief execu-
tive officer; 174 barring him from holding any position specifically respon-
sible for overseeing previously mishandled duties or requiring any
position held by the defendant to be one where major decisions are sub-
ject to review by experienced and independent counsel; 175 prohibiting
him from rendering advice on financial matters; 176 and in cases of gross
misconduct, prohibiting the defendant from undertaking to control or
influence a specific corporation in any of its affairs.1 77 Another possibil-
ity includes limiting the manner in which the defendant exercises share-
holder voting rights. For instance, he might be ordered not to vote
certain securities, 78 or not to nominate anyone to the corporation's
board of directors for a period of time.
179
Although orders may be subject to challenge on grounds of vague-
ness or overbreadth, the imprecision of some of the conditions described
above need not be fatal to the disqualification order. In Hoa v. Saxbe,' 80
for example, the court rejected Hoffa's argument that an order forbid-
ding his "direct or indirect" participation in management of union ac-
tivities imposed an inordinate risk of his engaging in impermissible
indirect management and thereby violating his parole condition:
While we fully agree that the term "indirect" is of imprecise meaning, we
must also recognize that the use of such terms are often necessary to in-
clude within the scope of the prohibition those activities which though ob-
viously within the intended purpose of a prohibition are not amenable to
easy categorization or enumeration.181
The possibility of a federal court removing executives as a condi-
cases involving civil occupational disqualifications. The concept is adaptable to probational
disqualifications.
172 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
173 SEC v. Generics Corp., Litigation Release No. 7270 (Feb. 10, 1976), 8 SEC Docket
1291.
174 SEC v. TDA Indust., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC Docket
534.
175 SEC v. Geo Dynamics Oil & Gas, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7423 (June 1, 1976), 9
SEC Docket 812.
176 SEC v. Giant Stores Corp., Litigation Release No. 7546 (Sept. 2, 1976), 10 SEC Docket
400.
177 SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., Litigation Release No. 7508 (Aug. 2, 1976), 10 SEC
Docket 194.
178 SEC v. TDA Indust., Inc., Litigation Release No. 7, 369 (Apr. 23, 1976), 9 SEC Docket
534.
179 SEC v. OSEC Petroleum, S.A. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,915, at 97,132 (D.D.C. 1974).
180 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974).
181 Id. at 1240.
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tion of probation raises the issue of which forms of misconduct will war-
rant judicial intervention into the traditional realm of managerial
discretion. It is suggested that disqualifying a convicted corporate offi-
cial in only those situations where there is evidence of knowing or repeti-
tive criminal conduct by the executive, or a material possibility of
recurrent violations, limits the use of the sanction to those cases where
the public interest is manifest. 182
Disqualification could be useful in two general situations. The first
is when a sentencing judge concludes that some form of punishment, in
addition to fines and the ordeal which accompanies indictment and con-
viction, is deserved, but that the defendant should not be imprisoned.
In less serious cases, then, the executive might be excluded only from
holding an authoritative position within a particular corporation-a
kind of forced demotion. Disqualifying a corporate officer from a posi-
tion, but allowing him to continue at the firm, will protect the public
interest by limiting his access to inside formation, which one commenta-
tor deems essential to prevailing in decision-making and directing corpo-
rate activities. 8 3 Additionally, disqualification diminishes the offender's
control of information-another important resource-and thereby
reduces his formal authority within the firm.1
8 4
A second situation when disqualification would be useful is where
aggravating factors are present. A partial listing of these factors, none of
which of itself necessarily demands disqualification, includes: predatory
or coercive conduct such as threats and use of force or economic repri-
sals; prior convictions; the extent of the violation; the size of monetary
loss to consumers, competitors, or government; whether unsafe products
knowingly were marketed and actually reached or affected consumers;
the defendant's recognition of the wrongfulness of his conduct and the
sincerity of representations or assurances against future violations; and
his level of responsibility. 8 5 In a case where these aggravating factors
182 The American Bar Association endorses the application of a disqualifying sanction in
the following circumstances:
(A) Where the criminal activity was engaged in by the defendant on behalf of the
organization with knowledge of its illegality; and
(B) Where the crime was repetitive or was part of a substantial criminal conspiracy of
which the official was aware for a sustained period; or
(CD Where the crime amounted to a serious breach of trust against the organization.
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING AL-
TERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 18-2.8(iii) (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA SEN-
TENCING STANDARDS]. The situations posed in (A) and (B) above present the main threats to
law enforcement. The crimes contemplated in (C) would most likely lead to dismissal by the
corporation, making disqualification unnecessary in most such instances.
183 See Jones, Corporate Govemace.- Who Controlr the Large Corporation, 30 HAST. L.J. 1261,
1275 (1979).
184 Id.
185 Some of these factors are derived from a list of recommended prosecution guidelines for
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combine to make a more severe punishment imperative, a court may
choose to impose a split sentence comprised of a prison term of three to
six months followed by a period of disqualification.186 If the court com-
pletely bars the employment of the convicted official at a specific firm,
disqualification amounts to dismissal. Alternatively, following incarcer-
ation the court might prohibit employment at a comparable level at any
firm, to prevent lateral transfer which would eviscerate the prophylactic
aspect of the sanction.
87
As with all sentences, the judge, the probation officer, and the Di-
rector of the Bureau of Prisons should use their flexible powers to inves-
tigate mitigating circumstances raised by the defendant. 88
Furthermore, as expressly provided in the Federal Probation Act, courts
can revoke or modify conditions during the probationary period.' 8 9
Also, the duration of disqualification will be subject to the five-year stat-
utory limit specified for probation conditions generally.'9' Should the
disqualified executive violate the terms of his probation, he is subject to
arrest and revocation of probation, and the court "may impose any sen-
tence which might originally have been imposed." 191
VIII. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION
Applicable federal statutes do not specifically authorize courts to
restrict defendants from engaging in the business activities in which the
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. justice Department. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA), No. 790, at AA-1, 2 (Nov. 23, 1976).
186 A split sentence is a form of probation under the Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1976). When a court imposes a sentence in excess of six months, it can then confine
the defendant in a prison or treatment facility for a period not to exceed six months. In such
a case, the court then suspends the execution of the remainder of the sentence and places the
defendant on probation. To qualify for a split sentence, the offense must carry a maximum
punishment of greater than six months and imposition of sentence may not be suspended.
Professor Coffee recommends a short sentence of three to six months as the "benchmark
norm" for most willful organizational crimes. Coffee, supra note 34, at 470.
187 But see ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 178, § 18-2.8 comment, at 176. The
ABA proposes limiting disqualification to apply only to the convicted person's corporation
and not to corporations generally.
188 See Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White-Collar Crime, in SEC ENFORCE-
MENT AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES, 997, 1042 (A. Mathews ed. 1979). See also MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 7.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1966):
(3) The pre-sentence investigation shall include an analysis of the circumstances at-
tending the commission of the crime, the defendant's history of delinquency or criminal-
ity, physical and mental condition. Family situation and background, economic status,
education, occupation and personal habits and any other matters that the probation
officer deems relevant or the court directs to be included.
189 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
190 Id.
'91 Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 266 n.2 (1943). If the corporation were con-
victed along with the executive and then violated a probation order by rehiring him in an
unauthorized position, the court could cite the corporation for contempt.
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crimes occurred, but a substantial body of case law indicates that dis-
qualification is presently within the discretionary sentencing power of
federal judges. 192 Many courts have held that the conditions listed in
the Federal Probation Act are only advisory and do not preclude judi-
cial experimentation with sentencing alternatives.
193
Indeed, federal judges currently impose conditions or sentences
which have less precedential support and are arguably more intrusive
than disqualification. One federal court, for example, ordered five dairy
industry executives convicted of price-fixing to serve the poor, reasoning
that newsmaking sentences carry greater deterrent effect than routine
sentences. 194 Other federal courts have imposed conditions not specified
in the Probation Act: convicted price-fixers were ordered to deliver
community speeches explaining their crimes; 9 5 two meatpacking com-
pany executives were directed to perform 200 hours of voluntary chari-
table service, while the company was ordered to hire ex-convicts and
train them as meat cutters; 96 a corporation convicted of dumping poi-
sonous wastes into a river was placed under temporary supervision of an
Environmental Protection Agency official; 197 and an oil company which
pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of emitting refuse into navigable wa-
ters was ordered to devise within forty-five days an agenda to control oil
spillage, or face appointment of a special probation officer. 198 These
sanctions exemplify the innovation which judges currently employ to
counter white-collar crime.
Another unique sentence was imposed in United States v. Arthur.199
There a defendant convicted of misapplication of bank funds to bribe
public officials was assigned probation on the condition that he accept
full-time employment for two years at any charitable organization ap-
192 See srupra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
193 See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 537 F.2d 1184, 1186 (1976). Seegeneraly, Note, The
Application of the Federal Probation Act to the Corporate Entity, 3 U. BALT. L. REv. 294, 305 (1974):
"To view the Federal Probation Act as merely a passive statute of limited use is to ignore its
well-established liberal construction as a remedial means to reform and supervise a defendant
of unusual character or circumstance."
194 United States v. Borden, Inc. Crim. No. 74-319 (D. Ariz. 1974). The case is discussed in
BNA Spedal Report, supra note 40, at 10.
195 United States v. Blankenheim, No. CR-74-182-CBR (N.D. Cal. 1974).
196 United States v. Kansas City Meat Co., No. Cr. 74-1728 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1975).
The two individual co-defendants each received two-year probations, including 200 hours of
voluntary service with a charitable organization. The company received a three-year proba-
tion, with the requirement that it employ three hard-core unemployable persons.
197 United States v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., No. C.R. 71-279 (N.D. Ohio
1972).
198 United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972) later overturned
this condition, holding it unauthorized by the Federal Probation Act.
199 602 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1981).
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proved by the Probation Department. 200 This penalty is an indirect
form of disqualification in that full-time charitable work virtually pre-
cludes high level banking employment. Although the sentence did not
order the executive to terminate his bank employment, as disqualifica-
tion would, forced long-term charitable work is arguably more intrusive
than disqualification because it affirmatively demands an alternative oc-
cupation and provides that no compensation be accepted.
Some commentators, however, contend that such sentencing inno-
vations are proper only when based on specific legislative enactments.
They argue that traditional principles of criminal law dictate that po-
tential offenders know the nature of the penalties to which they are sub-
ject, and that special conditions of probation constitute unforeseeable
penalties.2
01
Although statutory adoption of a special condition would indicate
legislative countenance of alternative sentences, such approval is not
necessary.202 The Federal Probation Act expressly vests wide discretion
in the judiciary, stating that a court may place a defendant on proba-
tion "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best. '203 In
declining to list an exclusive set of probation conditions, Congress speci-
fied that fines, restitution and child support are only "among the condi-
tions" which might be imposed.204 In fact, the enumeration of
probation conditions-currently proposed in the Senate bill to reform
the criminal code 20 -was prompted by the drafters' perceptions that
courts were too seldom using their discretion to fashion alternatives to
fines and imprisonment.20 6
Legislative specification of additional conditions may, for practical
reasons, be well-advised. This would lessen the burden on judges, whose
views on sentencing may not have changed over time, to design on their
own initiative conditions such as disqualification. Not surprisingly, one
200 The court said that while such a condition may not be appropriate in every case, the
"donation of charitable services to the community is both a deterrent to other potential offend-
ers and a ymbolic form of restitution to the public for having breached the criminal laws."
602 F.2d at 664 (emphasis added).
201 See, e.g., Dershowitz, Paper Label Sentences: Critique, 86 YALE LJ. 626 (1977).
202 See Best & Birzan, supra note 165, at 834. The authors argue for greater legislative
control over the use of special conditions of probation, preferably by legislative enumeration
of allowable conditions, but concede that the objectives of probation require some judicial
discretion and flexibility.
203 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
204 Id.
20 5 See Kennedy, Commentapy-The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act andNew Sentencing Alterna-
tives, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 423, 424-27 (1980).
206 Senator Kennedy writes that "[e]xisting federal probation statutes suggest few possible
probationary conditions and fail to provide wide ranging alternatives to all or part of a prison
sentence." Id. at 241.
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federal judge has expressed reservations about using disqualifying sanc-
tions without the specific authorization of Congress.207 Additionally,
legislation might be useful should Congress decide to provide funding
for training special probation officers to monitor compliance with inno-
vative conditions imposed on executives or corporations.208
While Congress has considered several bills listing disqualification
among the various discretionary conditions available to a court, the out-
come remains uncertain.20 9 The concept was supported by a number of
commentators who testified before Congress2 10 and opposition, though
vociferous at first, has softened over time, as indicated by American Bar
Association endorsement of occupational disqualification in its Sentenc-
ing Standards.
2 11
Although a form of disqualification was written into law in Great
207 Writing for the court in United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976), Judge
Feinberg said that
imprisonment, monetary impositions and community treatment programs are potent
and possibly sufficient sanctions for a sentencing judge. Perhaps the suitability of a de-
fendant for continuing in a particular job should not be determined in the sentencing
process unless the legislature specifically authorizes it, but should be resolved in other
ways and in other forums and guided when possible by the legislature."
Id. at 682. Judge Feinberg argued that in Pastore, disbarrment was available as a "well-de-
fined procedure." No such procedure exists to discipline corporate executives.
208 Se Reform Hearings, 1972, supra note 81, at 1666 (statement of Alan Ruben). Professor
Ruben suggested the use of specially trained probation officers in cases requiring supervision
of the corporation itself. Such special training would also serve to effectuate disqualification
of executives.
209 The concept originated in NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (TITLE 18, UNITED STATES
CODE), § 405(2) (1970):
When an executive officer or other manager of an organization is convicted of an offense
committed in furtherance of the affairs of the organization, the court may include in the
sertence an order disqualifying him from exercising similar functions in the same or
other organizations for a period not exceeding five years, if it finds the scope or willful-
ness of his illegal actions make it dangerous or inadvisable for such functions to be en-
trusted to him.
From the Study Draft, the proposal was accepted with minor changes in wording in the
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
§ 3502 (1971). The concept was incorporated as a condition of probation into S. 1, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-4A3(b) (1973) ("Disqualification"), then into S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2103(b)(13) (1973) ("Probation-Discretionary Conditions'), and most recently into S. 1722,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2103(b) (6) (1980) ("refrain, in the case of an individual, from engag-
ing in a specified occupation, business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship
to the conduct constituting the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or
profession only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances.'). It was not in the House
bill to reform the Federal Criminal Code. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). S. 1722
was reintroduced in the present Congress as S. 1630, the "Criminal Code Reform Act of
1981" with the disqualification provision still intact for individuals. S. 1630, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 2103(b)(6). See S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1013 (1981).
210 See Reform Hearings, 1979, supra note 74, at 10141-42 (statement of Mark Green), 10029-
30 (statement of ABA).
211 See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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Britain by the passage of the Companies Act of 1948,212 the concept has
only recently been incorporated into American statutes. The criminal
codes of two states added disqualification to the sentencing powers of
the state courts, but the statutes have yet to be invoked.
21 3
IX. CONCLUSION
To believe that judges must impose meaningful sanctions on con-
victed executives is not to suggest that substantial imprisonment is al-
ways necessary. Disqualification, used in conjunction with a short
prison term in egregious cases, or as part of a suspended sentence with
probation and fines for less serious offenses, provides an alternative to
lengthy incarceration. The need for disqualification is based on the po-
tential for harm which can be inflicted on the public through abuse of
occupational authority by executives seeking to benefit their corpora-
tions. Disqualification is a response to the inability of traditional penal-
ties to punish and deter violations. To compensate for the failure of
internal corporate controls, it invokes a measure of external control over
hiring practices. Although disqualification is consistent with judicial in-
terpretation of the present Probation Act, its inclusion by Congress in a
statutory enumeration of alternatives to imprisonment would serve to
further legitimate the sanction.
MARTIN F. MCDERMOTr
212 Section 188 of the Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, confers the "[p]ower to
restrain fraudulent persons from managing companies." Broad in scope, the Companies Act
also authorizes the disqualification of individuals found to have committed certain civil
frauds while acting as company officers.
213 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-303 (1978):
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a corporation or association is
convicted of an offense committed in furtherance of the affairs of the corporation or
association, the court may include in the sentence an order disqualifying him from exer-
cising similar functions in the same or other corporations or associations for a period of
not exceeding five years if it finds the scope or willfulness of his illegal actions make it
dangerous or inadvisable for such functions to be entrusted to him.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1153 (1980):
(2) Ifa director, trustee or managerial agent ofan organization is convicted of a class A
or class B crime committed on its behalf, the court may include in the sentence an order
disqualifying him from holding office in the same or other organizations for a period not
exceeding five years, if it finds the scope or nature of his illegal actions make it dangerous
or inadvisable for such office to be entrusted to him.
Comment-subsection 2 gives the court the flexibility to diminish the chances of any
particular organization's agent engaging in similar criminal behavior in the future.
19821
